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COLLOQUIUM 
THE VARIED ROLES, REGULATION, 
AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 
OF GOVERNMENT LAWYERS 
LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE— 
A FOREWORD 
Bruce A. Green* 
 
Lawyers in government serve in many different roles, both 
representational and nonrepresentational.  Some represent the federal, state, 
or local government, a particular governmental entity (such as a department 
of consumer affairs) or agency (such as the NLRB), or public officials in their 
official capacity.  These lawyers render a range of legal services and act as 
litigators, negotiators, drafters, and counselors.  Other lawyers in government 
serve in nonrepresentative capacities; for example, as elected or appointed 
officials or as their aides.  Scholarship on government lawyers addresses 
these varied roles and functions from varied perspectives, drawing on 
different bodies of law and legal theory. 
The eight articles in this collection could not possibly cover the full range 
of government lawyers’ work, but they do range widely, addressing 
government lawyers’ roles as legal advisors1 and policy advisors,2 as agency 
officials3 and agency counsel,4 as state and federal attorneys general,5 and as 
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criminal prosecutors6 and civil enforcement lawyers.7  Two of the writings 
offer historical perspectives.8  Others illuminate the work of contemporary 
government lawyers—for example, Stephen Lee and Sameer Ashar study 
federal immigration lawyers in the Obama administration,9 while Peter 
Margulies explores what he calls “lifeboat lawyering” in the Trump 
administration.10 
These writings make interesting individual contributions while also 
addressing common concerns, the most prominent being government 
lawyers’ discretion.  The writings belie the concept of government lawyers’ 
work as ministerial or purely technocratic.11  As Lee and Ashar demonstrate, 
government lawyers exercise discretion across a range of lawyering roles and 
professional services.12  And how they exercise it, whether in giving advice, 
enforcing the law, or otherwise, has significant public impact.  Consider 
Daniel Ernst’s account of Jerome Frank’s work as general counsel of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration in the Roosevelt administration:  
through their interpretation of the law, Ernst illustrates, government lawyers 
can significantly influence or restrict the agencies within which they work 
and the officials with whom they work.13  Or consider Lisa Grumet’s 
discussion of state attorneys general who file amicus briefs seeking to 
invalidate laws similar to those adopted by their own state legislatures:  
government lawyers have opportunities not only to carry out the legislative 
will but, as in this example, to frustrate it.14 
On balance, these studies suggest that government lawyers’ discretion is 
necessary, even if subject to abuse.  One question they explore is how to 
protect government lawyers’ independence from the inappropriate influence 
of the partisan political officials under whom they serve.  Rebecca Roiphe 
and I envision professional conduct rules and other professional norms as 
sources of federal prosecutors’ professional independence,15 and Peter 
Margulies likewise underscores the importance of federal government 
lawyers’ fidelity to unwritten norms that government officials may 
disregard.16  Pointing to political cronies whom presidents have sometimes 
appointed to serve as their attorneys general, Jed Shugerman argues that 
federal prosecutors need greater structural independence from the president 
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in order to protect against “partisanship, self-dealing, and cronyism.”17  
Melissa Mortazavi similarly emphasizes the need for institutional structures 
to bolster, not undermine, government lawyers’ professional independence.18 
If government lawyers are not mechanistically implementing elected 
officials’ direction but are exercising power and discretion in meaningful 
ways in their own right, then what makes their exercise of authority 
legitimate and how are they to be held accountable?  Brad Wendel and 
Melissa Mortazavi each explore this question.19  Wendel says that it is not 
enough for government lawyers to claim to act in “the public interest”—at 
least not in accordance with their own personal conceptions of the public 
interest—because “[l]awyers in general do not have privileged access to 
knowledge of the common good.”20  But government lawyers’ exercise of 
discretion may find legitimacy through their commitment to the rule of law 
and their employment of accepted professional conventions for interpreting 
the law21 and for enforcing it.22  And institutional cultures can support 
government lawyers’ commitment to professional norms.23 
My thanks to each of the authors both for contributing their writings to this 
collection and for previously presenting their works in progress at the 
Colloquium on The Varied Roles, Regulation, and Professional 
Responsibilities of Government Lawyers at Fordham University School of 
Law on October 12, 2018.  This Colloquium was the most recent in almost a 
quarter-century of collaborations between the Fordham Law Review and the 
Stein Center for Law and Ethics around themes of significance to the legal 
profession.  This time, we were joined in organizing the Colloquium by 
Rebecca Roiphe, who directs New York Law School’s Institute for 
Professional Ethics, Brad Wendel of Cornell Law School, and Ellen 
Yaroshefsky, who directs Hofstra Law School’s Freedman Institute for the 
Study of Legal Ethics.  My thanks to them as well as to Kathleen Clark and 
Lisa Fairfax who presented additional works in progress on government 
lawyers at the Colloquium.  And most especially, I am grateful to the student 
editors and staff of the Fordham Law Review for their characteristically 
sterling editorial contributions to this collection. 
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